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 Concentration Change and Countervailing Power in
 the U.S. Food Manufacturing Industries
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 2 Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts, U.SA.
 Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the countervailing power of grocery
 retailers has had a restraining influence on increases in seller market concentration in the U.S.
 food manufacturing industries. We empirically test this notion by examining changing four-firm
 concentration (ACR4) from 1967 to 1987 across 48 processed food product classes. Employing a
 model developed and tested by Venturini, we measure countervailing power of retailers with the share
 of market sales of private-label products.
 For the 20-year period four variables were found to be significant determinants of ACR4.
 However, for the most recent 1977-1987 period, virtually no significant determinants are discovered.
 Unlike Venturini, no evidence of countervailing power could be detected in the 1980s and only weakly
 or rarely in the longer period. We suggest that the lax federal antitrust enforcement of the 1980s,
 measurement problems, or sampling criteria may be responsible for this unexpected outcome.
 Key words: Countervailing power, grocery retailing, food manufacturing, concentration change,
 private labels.
 I. Introduction
 The evidence that high sales concentration among U.S. food manufacturers leads to
 higher-than-competitive selling prices and profits seems overwhelming. Drawing
 on data from 1950 to the mid-1970s, numerous statistical investigations established
 significant, positive relationships between seller concentration and oligopolistic
 performance indicators (Connor et al. 1985: Chapter 7). These studies generally
 give consistent predictions. When one compares the lowest observed levels of
 concentration with the highest observed levels, ceteris paribus, processed food
 prices rise about 10 to 1 4 percent, price-cost margins (gross margins) rise about 65
 percent, and profits increase about 100-200 percent. Since most of these studies
 were published, a number of criticisms have been raised about the assumptions
 imbedded in the Bainsian structure-conduct-performance (SCP) approach and the
 interpretation of results. However, a recent survey of newer estimation techniques
 that relax most of the SCP assumptions found that concentration continues to exert a
 An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference entitled 'Economics of Innovation
 - The Case of the Food Industry', sponsored by the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Piacenza,
 Italy, June 10-1 1, 1994. The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful reviews of Steve Erickson and
 Paul Farris of Purdue University. Purdue Journal Paper Number 14317.
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 positive relationship on the size of consumer overcharges in the food manufacturing
 industries (Connor and Peterson, 1996).
 It is the negative relationship between concentration and static allocative
 efficiency1 that has caused economists to view with dismay the seemingly inex-
 orable rise in food industry concentration in the United States. In 1947, the top
 four food manufacturers selling their products in broad geographic markets2 held
 an average of about 40 percent of their markets. The most recent information from
 the 1 987 Census of Manufactures shows that the average CR4 forty years later was
 at least 60 percent in national food industries.
 The two determinants of changing concentration in the U.S. food manufacturing
 industries were believed to be well understood (Rogers, 1984). First, there was a
 "regression toward the mean" effect; that is, initial-period CR4 was inversely
 related to change in concentration (ACR4). Second, media advertising intensity,
 more specifically the electronic media of radio and television, accelerated ACR4 ,
 presumably by creating long-lasting barriers to new market entry. Generally, tests
 have failed to confirm that either market demand growth or plant economies of
 scale had any significant effects on ACR4.3 However, a recent paper by Venturini
 (1993) proposed that Rogers' model was incompletely specified. He altered a well-
 known two-stage, game theory model of Sutton (1991) that incorporates vertical
 competition by retailers as an explanation of market concentration change. Fitted
 with 1958-1977 data from the U.S. food manufacturing industries, Venturini' s
 proxy for vertical competition does indeed slow down the change in CR4. This
 finding, if upheld, has important consequences for public competition policies.4
 The issue known to economists as the efficacy of countervailing power is basi-
 cally the same as the question addressed in the business-management literature:
 Has market power shifted from food manufacturers to food retailers, or vice-versal
 Opinion surveys of food marketing companies appear to confirm a shift in power
 toward retailers. A 1992 survey of grocery chains, wholesalers, and manufacturers
 found agreement among all three groups that power had shifted (61 to 85 percent
 agreed) and that the shift favored retailers (55 to 87 percent agreed) ('Progressive
 Grocer', April, 1992, Part 2, p. 25). Chu and Messinger (1993) identified five
 major reasons for increased retailer clout: (1) the proliferation of new products by
 manufacturers, which has forced manufacturers to offer more trade promotions,
 including slotting and renewal allowances, to retailers; (2) greater retailer access
 to information on product sales due to the widespread adoption of scanner-check-
 1 Rising concentration may give rise to compensating improvements in dynamic performance, but
 the evidence is not so clear as it is for static performance.
 That is, omitting highly localized markets, such as those for fluid milk, bread, animal feeds,
 soft-drink bottling, and manufactured ice. Reliable information on changes in concentration in local
 markets is not available.
 3 The period covered in Rogers' study was 1958-1977. Retesting this model with 1967-1982
 changes in concentration upheld the earlier results (Tokle, Rogers, and Adams, 1990).
 4 The finding also calls into question whether the static structure-performance results were mis-
 specified by omitting measurements of retailer power. See the literature review below.
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 out technology; (3) increased grocery retailer concentration in local markets; (4)
 slowing overall growth and declining effectiveness of advertising in food markets;
 and (5) greater numbers of private-label programs.
 Yet, rigorous tests of this alleged shift in power have yet to be seen. While food
 retailer concentration has indeed increased in the United States, food manufacturer
 concentration properly measured increased apace (Marion et al ., 1987). While the
 inflation-adjusted amount spent on food advertising by manufacturers remained
 almost constant in the 1980s, that is hardly evidence that advertising effectiveness
 has declined. The most satisfactory approach taken to analyze this question has
 been to look at relative profit rates or stock prices of manufacturers and retailers
 over time. Farris and Ailawadi (1992) examined the profits of listed companies
 from 1972 to 1990 and concluded that grocery retailer profits were steady while
 food manufacturer profits rose. A similar study using somewhat better samples
 found that comparing 1986-1991 profits on equity with 1961-1966 profits, food
 manufacturers' profits rose much more than retailers (Messinger and Narasimthan,
 1993, Table 12). Therefore, there is a contradiction between businesspersons'
 opinions on this issue and the scant quantitative analyses available.5
 The purpose of this paper is to explore further the role of countervailing power
 by grocery retailers on changing concentration in the U.S. food manufacturing
 industries. We develop and test alternative models of concentration change and new
 measures of vertical competition. In addition, we extend the period investigated by
 Venturini (1993) by ten years to 1987. There are several reasons to believe that the
 decade of the 1980s might yield quite different results than earlier periods.
 H. Countervailing Power
 John Kenneth Galbraith takes full credit for inventing the concept of countervail-
 ing power. "The notion ... has been almost completely excluded from economic
 thought" (Galbraith, 1952, pp. 1 10-1 11). Yet, finding a precise definition in Gal-
 braith's writing proves to be difficult. Perhaps the statement that comes closest
 is:
 Private economic power is held in check by the countervailing power of those
 who are subject to it. The first begets the second. The long trend toward
 concentration of industrial enterprise . . . has brought into existence not only
 strong sellers . . . .but also strong buyers (ibid., p. 1 1 1)
 Thus, according to Galbraith, countervailing power is an autonomous regulator
 of competition, which operates much like Adam Smith's invisible hand to check
 increases in seller concentration or improve static performance in the sellers'
 industry. The automatic nature of the countervailing power of organized buyers fits
 in well with Galbraith's evident disdain for government antitrust policies.
 5 There is a more satisfactory body of studies examining the relative power of farmers' marketing
 cooperatives and food manufacturers (see Rogers and Petraglia, 1994).
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 Galbraith, whose early career was devoted to agricultural economics, cites
 many examples of successful countervailing power in the food and agricultural
 system. Consumer retail food cooperatives in Scandinavia and farmers' marketing
 cooperatives in the United States are notable for restraining the market power of
 food manufacturers (ibid., p. 126 and pp. 155-165). Perhaps his favorite example
 of countervailing power was an episode in 1937 that involved the then largest U.S.
 grocery retailer, the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company (A&P). Concerned
 about the high price of corn flakes, A&P commissioned a costly consultants'
 study (2.1 million 1994 dollars) to establish the economic feasibility of vertically
 integrating into the manufacturing of breakfast cereals. When A&P showed this
 study to its suppliers, the mere threat to build a plant was sufficient to evoke a
 10 percent price discount from the breakfast cereal manufacturers (ibid., p. 1 19-
 123). However, Galbraith does admit that some industries with unusually strong
 solidarity and consumer brand loyalty may be able to resist countervailing power,
 tobacco manufacturing is given as an example (ibid., p. 122).
 The theory and empirical relevance of countervailing power was the subject
 of a memorable debate (Galbraith 1954, Stigler 1954). Galbraith' s critics noted
 the absence of a rigorous theory of bilateral oligopoly, while Stigler focussed on
 the lack of evidence that large-scale retailing firms arose most prominently to sell
 products made by the most concentrated manufacturing industries. That is, Stigler
 proposed that countervailing power would be verified by a test that demonstrated a
 correlation between high concentration in manufacturing industries and a parallel
 (or subsequent) rise in buyer concentration for those same products. It is ironic that
 while Galbraith's definition of countervailing power refers explicitly to concen-
 tration dynamics, all of his examples concern the static exercise of seller market
 power. Indeed, nearly all subsequent empirical verification of the countervailing
 power hypothesis has tested the static effects of buyer concentration on manufac-
 turers' profits or price-cost margins, where it has received modest support.6
 III. The Venturini Model
 Venturini (1993) must be credited with bringing economists back to a consideration
 of the dynamic implications of the countervailing power of distributors, which
 he has rechristened "Vertical Competition." Venturini's model explaining market
 concentration change draws on concepts from John Sutton's (1991) well-known
 book. Sutton, frustrated by the difficulties of operationalizing theoretical models of
 oligopoly, sought a simple, but robust prediction on the relationship between market
 concentration and market size. This question has occupied industrial-organization
 6 Scherer and Ross (1990) also discuss a related hypothesis. Sellers in producer-goods industries
 should have higher margins if the inputs they sell are "unimportant" to buyers {i.e., the intermediate
 products form a small share of all inputs used by buyers). At least three statistical studies confirm
 this relationship in U.S. manufacturing.
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 economists since the seminal book by Joe Bain (1966) on international differences
 in industrial concentration.
 In brief, Sutton's theory and empirical findings demonstrate that in the lim-
 it a negative relationship is present for industries where sunk costs of entry are
 exogenous, but the tendency toward déconcentration is lost when firms can pur-
 sue strategies to increase sunk costs-the case of endogenous sunk costs (Connor
 1992). The other major factor affecting market concentration is the degree of pric-
 ing toughness. When pricing is tough, markets will become more concentrated, as
 firms require larger market shares to cover their sunk costs. When pricing com-
 petition is lax, more firms can survive. Pricing toughness is in turn affected by
 government industrial policies and the degree of product differentiation. Pricing
 toughness would lessen as product differentiation increased, shifting the emphasis
 from price to nonprice rivalry. International comparisons of a series of histori-
 cal case studies of the food industries provided empirical verification of Sutton's
 theoretical predictions.
 Venturini extended Sutton's theory to include vertical competition between
 food distributors and food manufacturers. Venturini is specifically interested in
 the relationship between the branded and unbranded segments in the food sector
 and how vertical competition will affect market concentration. He hypothesized
 that industries that experience an increase in the share held by private labels will
 experience déconcentration. This hypothesis is justified with two models.
 In the first "technological" model, Venturini divides the consumers into two
 groups. Type I consumers of manufacturer brands are loyal to products, and Type
 II consumers are foodservice firms or retailers who purchase the food products
 to sell as own brands. The first group defines the size of the branded sector, 0,
 and the second group defines the size of the unbranded and private label sector,
 1-9 , where 0 < 9 < 1 . The private label segment is characterized by smaller
 manufacturing firms that do not advertise but compete solely on the basis of
 efficiency in production and distribution. These smaller firms can co-exist with the
 larger, marketing-oriented firms, because Type II consumers are unwilling to pay
 for the higher costs of marketing and advertising that brand manufacturers must
 incur.
 These two groups of firms are assumed to be distinct - no manufacturing
 firm supplies both types of buyers. The relationship between these two strategic
 groups is of primary interest in Venturini' s work. The fixed costs of each of these
 strategic groups will be markedly different. The branded group's fixed costs of
 production will consist of the sunk setup cost for a minimum efficient scale plant
 and endogenously determined advertising costs ( MES' ). The unbranded-private
 label group's fixed costs consist only of the costs involved in setting up an MES
 plant ( MES2 ). Given that the branded group's fixed costs are larger, then MES' >
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 MES2. Because in long-run equilibrium, all the firms within each strategic group
 are of equal size, the Herfindahl-Hirshman index of concentration (H) is:
 (1)
 Then substituting N = 6S/MES' and M = (1 - 6)S/MES2, he found:
 H = 9*MjM + {1_e)^MES2^ (2)
 where N and M are the equilibrium number of firms in the branded segment and
 private-label segment, and S is the total market size. Given that M E S' > M E S2,
 the partial derivative of H in [2] with respect to 6 is positive. Therefore, as the
 private-label share, (1 - 0), increases, concentration will fall, even though market
 size remains constant.
 Venturini' s second theoretical model builds on Sutton's two-stage, Cournot-
 Nash model with advertising an endogenous sunk cost for manufacturers of branded
 products. In the first stage, higher advertising expenditures could enhance the
 demand for a firm's product in the second stage. In this model there are again
 two groups of consumers, two strategic groups of manufacturers, and no dual
 branding. In the branded strategic group, advertising is positive and endogenous,
 while advertising is zero in the unbranded group. The equilibrium number of firms
 in both strategic groups (N and M ) is an outcome of Cournot-Nash competition.
 Under certain parametric assumptions, the partial derivative of H w.r.t. 6 yields:
 dH (252 + l)[(l-0)5]V2
 ~d0~0 ~2& • (3)
 A numerical analysis shows that, holding S constant, as 6 increases beyond 0.1,
 concentration will increase. Only at lower values of 9 does (3) become negative.
 Venturini also shows that H declines with increases in S.
 Therefore, taking into account both of Venturini 's models, a behavioral model
 of the following form is suggested:
 AH = a + /?i (PL) + fo- S, (4)
 where PL = ( 1 - 0) is the private-label share of a market of size 5. From Equations
 (2) and (3), we expect ß' < 0 and ßi < 0. Because the U.S. Herfindahl-Hirshman
 index of sales concentration H has only been published for the years 1982 and
 1987, too brief a span, we use ACR4 in place of AH. The two concentration
 indexes are known to be highly correlated within years, therefore changes in the
 two indexes ought to be closely correlated as well. Moreover, Equation (4) will
 be augmented with other explanatory variables that have performed well in past
 empirical studies.
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 IV. Private Labels and Vertical Competition in the Food Industries
 A critical feature of Venturini 's model is the assumption that the share of private-
 label products in total product category sales (PL) is a reasonable proxy for the
 countervailing power of grocery retailers. In this section we examine the definition
 of private-label products, describe their empirical significance in the food system,
 and appraise the suitability of PL as a variable in industrial-organization analysis.
 Foods and beverages sold in grocery stores may be divided into three analytical-
 ly significant categories: manufacturers' or packers' brands, private-label products,
 and unbranded products. All prepackaged foods in the United States are required to
 have on their labels "manufactured by. . . ," "packed by. . . ," or "distributed by. . . "
 The first two cases are commonly called "national brands" or "manufacturers'
 brands," many of which are distributed in only a few states of the USA. Manu-
 facturers* brands account for about two-thirds of the sales of grocery foods when
 measured at manufacturers' shipments values (Connor et al , 1985, p. 25). The
 degree of consumer loyalty or repetitive purchases varies along a spectrum from
 very strong to relatively weak. "Coca-Cola" and "Marlboro" are widely recognized
 as strong brands, but some brands are very weak. For example, most eggs are sold
 in U.S. stores with the name of the packer on the egg carton, but most grocery
 stores sell only one brand of eggs on a given day and frequently change the brand
 of eggs they stock in the store. This is an example of weak brand loyalty, so weak
 that eggs could just as well be sold in cartons without the packer's name. In other
 words, very weak packer brands shade into the private-label category.
 Private-labels are also known as "store brands" or "controlled brands" (and in
 British English are called "own brands"). Private-label products have labels that
 tell the consumer who is responsible for distributing the item, but the manufactur-
 er's name is practically never shown. The brand shown on the private-label food
 item is either a trademark owned by a grocery chain (a true "store brand") or a
 trademark owned by a wholesale distributor7 (a true "controlled brand"). Store
 brand programs are typically found among the 40 to 50 largest U.S. grocery retail
 chains, whereas smaller chains and independent stores contract with wholesalers
 to use their controlled brands (Marion et al , 1987). Thus, it is not unusual to see
 the same private-label trademarks in the stores of two or more smaller retailers in
 the same city. Most commercial data sources cannot distinguish between retailer
 store brands and wholesaler controlled brands.
 The leading grocery chains obtain their private-label products in two ways. First,
 most large chains vertically integrate backward into food manufacturing. Parker
 (1975) presented data that the 40 largest U.S. grocery chains manufactured foods
 in their own plants that accounted for 9.8 percent of their retail sales in 1954; the
 share dropped to 6.9 percent in 1967 and has remained at about 7 percent since then
 (Marion et al ., 1987, Table 5-8). Grocery retailers account for about 2.5 percent of
 total food manufacturing output in the United States, but it is highly concentrated
 7 The distributor is usually a U.S.-based grocery wholesaler, but in some cases it is the importer.
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 in fluid milk, ice cream, bread, meat products, and roasted coffee (Connor et al.,
 1985, Table B-9).
 Second, the major part of private label products are purchased by retailers or
 wholesalers on a negotiated basis from generally small food manufacturers (Connor
 et a/., 1985, pp. 219-226). Retailers frequently renegotiate prices and frequently
 change their suppliers. This is especially true of generics , a special kind of private-
 label products that is distinctly lower in quality and price than regular private-labels.
 Regular private-label products typically sell for 15 to 20 percent lower retail prices
 than manufacturers' brands, and retailers attempt to match the quality standards
 of the leading brands. The variety and perceived quality of private-label products
 affect the enterprise images of grocery retailers. At their peak, only 5 to 10 percent
 of the sales of private-label food products were generics (Wills and Menzer, 1982).
 In the United States, private-label products have accounted for 10 to 14 percent
 of total grocery-store sales volume (Galbraith, 1993). This private-label share is
 closely related to macroeconomic conditions. The share reached almost 14 percent
 in 1982, a year of deep recession and high unemployment; fell monotonically to
 about 10 percent by 1988 during years of robust growth; and rose again to 14
 percent in the early 1990s. Private label shares are even higher in several European
 countries.8
 Private-label penetration in the United States varies considerably across product
 categories. In 1980, private-label (and generic) products accounted for very low
 sales shares in canned baby food {PL = 0.7 percent), ready-to-eat breakfast cereals
 (3.0 percent), and frozen dinners (4.2 percent) (Connor et al.y 1985, p. 222).
 However, PL was very high in sugar (54.6 percent), frozen orange juice (54.0
 percent), canned peaches (50.5 percent), and canned tomatoes (49.6 percent). An
 even more complete study of 1980 shares found that private-label products as
 a group were the leading "brand" in 81 out of 378 warehoused food product
 categories. Data from 1993 show that U.S. private-label shares are in most cases
 similar to 1980 (Galbraith, 1993; Shapiro, 1993).
 There is considerable research trying to explain cross-sectional variation in PL.
 Parker (1975) showed that backward vertical integration into food manufacturing
 in the 1960s by grocery retailers was significantly positively correlated with con-
 centration in food manufacturing; the simple correlation coefficient ranged from
 +0.45 to +0.68. Parker considered this strong evidence that the manufacture of
 8 In 1992-1993, private-label foods had captured almost 30 percent of the sales in British and
 Swiss super-markets, more than 20 percent of the French and German, and almost 20 percent of the
 Dutch and Belgian markets (Ogilvie, 1994, p. 26; Hughes, 1994). The French retailer Carrefour sells
 more than 3,000 store brands that are priced on average 15 percent lower than the leading brands
 in the same category. The leading U.K. grocery retailer, Sainsbury, has 8,000 private-label items out
 of 16,000 items in its average store (de Lisser and Helliker, 1994). Moreover, Sainsbury has been
 introducing 1,400 to 1,500 new private-label products each year, while dropping hundreds of others
 that have proved unpopular. Gross margins on Sainsbury 's private-label products are twice as high
 as the margins on manufacturers' brands. The extensive private-label programs of European grocery
 retailers have been aided by the formation of international wholesale "buying groups" (Linda, 1993).
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 private-label products occurs in industries with market power, unless the industry
 was too small to allow retailers to achieve economies of scale or the loyalty to
 manufacturers' brands was too great. Later, Parker and Connor (1979) extended
 this analysis to the determinants of the total PL share, both own-manufactured and
 purchased. Using 1 976 data on 41 processed-food classes,9 they fitted the following
 equation:
 PL - 36.0 - 0.22CR4- 2.31TAS, R2 = 0.94
 (3.78) (4.33) ( '
 where TAS is the total media advertising-to-sales ratio (¿-statistics are given in
 parentheses). Therefore in this sample, nearly all the variation in PL is explained
 by manufacturing CR4 and the intensity of advertising.
 Other researchers have found that PL helps explain food manufacturers' profits
 or selling prices. A small study by Horst ( 1 974) found that a dummy variable for PL
 (= 1 when PL was high) had a significant negative effect on (1) 1969-1971 food
 firms' profits as a percent of stockholders equity and (2) 1963 food manufacturing
 price-cost margins. A more ambitious study of 1979-1980 average, U.S., retail,
 food-brand prices found that private-label prices were 7 to 1 2 percent lower than the
 prices of comparable manufacturers' brands, ceteris paribus 10 (Wills and Mueller,
 1989).
 Private-label share would seem to be an incomplete measure of vertical compe-
 tition between food retailers and food manufacturers. Relative information access,
 temporal measures of advertising or promotion effectiveness, and measures of the
 actual share of promotions received by retailers relative to manufacturers' willing-
 ness to pay are all potentially useful indicators of relative power. However, none of
 these is measurable at this time to our knowledge. By contrast, PL is measurable,
 though difficult or expensive to obtain.
 It seems desirable to include the sales of both regular private-labels and generics
 in any measure of PL . But what about the third category of grocery products-
 unbranded goods? Unbranded foods are found mainly in fresh meats and seafood,
 fresh fruits and vegetables, random-cut cheeses, and certain delicatessen items.
 These items are purchased in bulk and sorted or wrapped by retailers in their
 stores. Because retailers have typically resisted encroachment by branded products
 into their unbranded product categories, we believe that it is appropriate lo include
 unbranded sales in any measure of PL as we have done in this study.
 9 These 41 five-digit SIC product-class observations were built up from 167 finer product cate-
 gories taken from a leading commercial supplier of grocery market information. The sample included
 all warehouse grocery categories with PL > 5 percent
 10 Being held constant are advertising intensity {TAS), the leading brand market share, and
 generics' presence and share. This monumental study had a sample of thousands of brands of
 processed foods and beverages.
 482 JOHN M. CONNOR ET AL.
 V. The Sample
 In 1987 the Census includes 160 processed food and tobacco product classes (five-
 digit SICs) which most economists agree better represent the product definitions of
 consumer product markets than more aggregated definitions. However, sometimes
 the more aggregated four-digit industry definition provides the best correspondence
 with an economic market (e.g., beer). To arrive at the final sample of food and
 tobacco markets to test the hypotheses, we first removed the 47 product classes
 that were classified as producer goods. From the remaining 113 consumer-product
 classes, those product classes that were too narrowly defined at the five-digit
 level were replaced by the more appropriate four-digit industry or by a special
 combination given by the Census in a 1987 special tabulation (see Connor et
 al, , 1985 for a description of the special tabulations for 1977 and prior census
 years). This left 101 markets but six more were not appropriate economic markets
 for various reasons.11 This left 95 food and tobacco markets as the universe for
 inclusion in the present study.
 The last major reason for the loss of observations was the lack of reliable
 information on private label (and generic) shares held in each product class. We
 took the data developed by Willis and Rogers (1994) for their advertising intensity
 model, for which they calculated private label shares held in each of 60 food
 and tobacco markets for the year 1987. Their major source was SAMI, but they
 also used IRI data for a handful of observations and industry knowledge in four
 additional cases (for details see Willis, 1992). To these data we added 1977 data,
 but since not all industries were comparable over time we lost a few observations
 (e.g., pasta). We also added broilers and turkeys to the Willis and Rogers data using
 industry information for the private label share.
 The net result was a sample of 48 food and tobacco markets which could be
 compared over the 1967 to 1987 period. These 48 observations represented 58
 percent of the value of 1987 shipments from the universe of nonproducer good
 product classes that at least approximated economic markets. Every three-digit
 industry group was represented in the data set. The complete list of industries,
 along with several variables, are given in Table II of Connor et al. (1995), sorted
 by the size of 1977-1987 change in concentration.
 VI. Variable Definitions
 1. Change in CR4(ACR4)
 The dependent variable is the absolute percentage point difference between ending
 concentration (Cfi487) and beginning concentration (either CRA11 or CÄ467),
 where concentration is measured by the percentage four-firm concentration ratio.
 11 Miscellaneous food products SIC 20999 or SIC 20873, soft drink syrup manufacturing was
 combined in just one observation on soft drinks, SIC 2086, to account for the vertical nature ofthat
 industry).
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 Others, most notably Wright (1978), rejected this specification due to its bound-
 edness [0, 100] and used a transformed dependent variable that treated a change
 in concentration from 4 to 5 the same as a change from 40 to 50 or from 95 to 96
 (see Rogers, 1984 for details). Previous research found Wright's specification had
 negligible effects on the estimates. We use only the simple arithmetic difference in
 this paper.
 2. Initial Concentration Ratio (ICR)
 ICR is the beginning year's four-firm concentration. In their survey article on
 concentration-change studies, Cuny and George (1 983) conclude that ICR was the
 most important explanatory variable. A negative relationship is expected because
 leading firms in concentrated industries are likely to lose market share over
 time to fringe firms by following dominant-firm strategies. In addition, empiri-
 cal researchers find unconcentrated industries tend to increase in concentration
 over time (Rogers 1984). ICR helps correct for the boundedness in A CR.
 3. Initial Size (IS)
 Industry size is measured by the natural logarithm of value of shipments in the
 initial year. Including IS follows directly from Equation (4).
 4. Growth (GRO)
 Since this is a concentration change study, some economists might argue that the
 most relevant variable is change in industry size or the industry's growth rate.
 In previous concentration-change studies, growth was the most commonly used
 explanatory variable, yet it has both theoretical and empirical support for either a
 negative or a positive influence on concentration change. If large firms outgrow
 small firms, as they might during strong merger waves, then growth could lead
 to higher concentration. However, if growth creates niches that encourage new
 entry on a small scale, then growth should result in lower concentration. Growth is
 measured by the percentage increase in value of shipments over time.
 5. Advertising Intensity (TAS)
 Economists differ on whether advertising impedes or encourages entry into con-
 sumer goods markets. A new firm entering a market with established firms that
 have been advertising their products for decades will likely turn to advertising to
 inform consumers of its new presence in the market. To switch consumers, entrants
 will usually have to advertise or promote their products more intensely than the
 incumbents. This use of advertising to assist entry is often cited as supporting the
 position that advertising aids entry. However, the higher advertising intensity of
 new entrants might trigger a reaction from existing firms who would escalate their
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 advertising levels to protect their market position. The likely result is that fewer
 firms can withstand the new, higher levels of advertising costs and some firms will
 fail. Connor et al. (1985) concluded that advertising-supported-and-maintained
 product differentiation was the primary barrier to entry in the food and tobacco
 manufacturing industries.
 Research on advertising and concentration has been frustrated by the lack of
 advertising data across a wide spectrum of industries. The first studies used crude
 categorical variables to represent the degree of product differentiation. Rogers and
 Tokle (1996) reviewed available data sources on advertising and concluded that the
 data supplied by a private commercial firm, Leading National Advertisers (LNA),
 are best suited to research on competition. In this study, we have TAS supplied
 by LNA for both 1977 and 1987, allowing us to test the change in advertising
 intensity hypothesis for a total media advertising-to-sales ratio.
 6. Private Label Share (PL)
 Vertical competition is measured by the percent share held by private label (and
 generic) products. The 1977 private label share, which includes unbranded food
 product sales, was calculated by Connor (1982). As PL increases we would expect
 retailers to countervail, as shown in Equation (4).
 7. Minimum Efficient Size (MES)
 MES serves as a technical barrier to entry created by economies of scale and,
 therefore, should be positively related to ACR. Four times MES is a lower bound
 on CR4. The MES value is critical to Sutton's model because it is a proxy for
 the exogenous sunk costs a firm must commit to enter an industry. In Venturini 's
 technological model, the effect of MES is already included in PL. Despite its
 theoretical appeal, the empirical proxies available suffer substantial shortcomings.
 The method of calculating MES in this and most other studies rely on the midpoint-
 plant size approach calculated from Census data. Although this approach has been
 shown to be highly correlated with the preferred economic-engineering estimates
 (Connor et al. 1985), the approach still suffers from being limited to single-product
 plant level economies of scale, rather than scope or firm level. Also it has an upward
 bias whenever constant costs are found, since large firms can expand beyond MES
 levels without a cost disadvantage. Moreover, as MES is by construction positively
 highly related to concentration, we make only limited use of it in models where
 initial concentration is included.
 To summarize, the augmented version of Equation (4) takes the following form:
 ACR4 = a+ßi ICR+foPL + ßtGRO+ßsIS+foTAS+fcMES + e
 (-) (-) (-) (+) (+) ' (6)
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 where the expected signs of the regression coefficients are given in parentheses.
 For these coefficients, we apply one-tail tests of statistical significance. Only the
 growth variable GRO has an ambiguous prediction.
 8. Descriptive Statistics
 The descriptive statistics of the main variables are given in Table III of Connor
 et al (1995). Concentration, as measured by the CR4, did increase on average
 over the two time periods of interest. A larger average increase took place in the
 second decade of 1977 to 1987 than in the decade from 1967 to 1977. By 1987,
 average sample concentration had increased 7.5 percentage points to reach nearly
 60 percent. The total advertising-to-sales ratio, TAS, had an average value of 2.4
 percent in 1 977 and 2.8 percent in 1 987. Since the data set excludes producer goods
 industries, no industry had zero advertising but substantial range does exist - from
 a low of 0.02 percent (vinegar and cider) to a high of 1 1 .7 percent (chewing gum)
 in 1977.
 PL , the percentage share held by private labels, in our sample averaged nearly
 13 percent in 1977 and increased to nearly 17 percent in 1987, with substantial
 variation in each year as some industries had no private label sales and one (broilers)
 had over half of its sales in the private label category. Although different procedures
 were used to calculate private label shares in 1977 and 1987, the data appear quite
 consistent.
 Industry size varied dramatically from the veiy small (canned mushrooms) to
 the very large (soft drinks). Growth in value of shipments measured in nominal
 terms increased on average 71 percent over the 1977 to 1987 period. The use of
 nominal growth does fail to capture the declining size of the cigarette industry as
 its price increases more than offset its reduced volume sold during this period.
 Finally, minimum efficient scale (MES), had an average value of 3 percent in
 1987, implying about 33 single-plant firms of optimal size would fit in the average
 food industry.
 Simple correlations for the main variables are given in Table IV of Connor
 et ai (1995) for the 1977 to 1987 period. Not surprisingly, CR477 and growth
 are negatively related to concentration change. But unexpectedly, the private label
 variables are positively related to concentration change and all of die advertis-
 ing variables are negatively related. MESH has the lowest simple correlation.
 Although simple correlations among independent variables do not give the full
 picture of potential multicollinearity problems, when two variables have a high
 correlation it can prove difficult to unravel their independent explanatory power in
 an OLS regression. Perhaps the most noteworthy is the high correlations between
 PL and CR411 and T ASH . In fact, a regression of PL on just CR4 and TAS
 (and T AS squared) yields a strong fit in each year, explaining just over half of the
 observed variation. This relationship between PL and standard structural variables
 is a concern for empirical testing of the vertical competition hypothesis. The high
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 positive correlation between MES and TAS is also of interest and suggests that
 sunk costs associated with building a MES plant are not unrelated to the degree of
 advertising intensity observed in an industry. It adds to our concern that the method
 of calculating MES reflects the common belief that large firms in concentrated
 industries build big plants not because MES requires it but because diseconomies
 of scale do not prevent it (Connor et al , 1985).
 VII. O LS Regression Results
 The most basic model that controls only for industry growth ( GRO ) and initial
 concentration {I CRII) shows no support for the hypothesis that the private label
 share in 1977 is negatively related to concentration change during the 1977 to
 1987 period (Table I, Equation la). To check whether this result was influenced by
 brevity of the time period, we expanded the period to 20 years (1967-1987) period
 and reestimated the same model, using ICR61, IS67 and growth over the 20 years
 (Equation lb). The results were more encouraging as percent private label PL11
 was negative and significant at the 10 percent level. In Equation 2a, we substitute
 TAS11 for the private label variable and add industry size IS. Contrary to a long
 history of research, the coefficient on TAS11 is insignificant. Again the same model
 was estimated over the longer 1967 to 1987 period; here the estimated coefficient
 moved toward positive significance but not nearly enough to reach conventional
 significance levels (Equation 2b). In Equations 3a and 3b we substitute separate
 variables for electronic and print advertising-to-sales ratios, but neither reaches
 significance. The last model of Table I uses both PL11 and TAS11 (Equations 4a
 and 4b). As expected, the collinearity between the two does lower their calculated
 t statistics compared with earlier equations.
 This difference in the results between the 1977 to 1987 period and the longer
 1967 to 1987 period will show itself repeatedly in the results. The 1977 to 1987
 period is continually marked by insignificance, and even reversal of estimated
 effects over the standard results found in the literature. Whether the advertising-
 concentration change finding is specific to the 1980s and the relaxed public policy
 of that era, or whether it marks the arrival of a new equilibrium, only future studies
 can tell.
 In Tables II and IH, we undertook examinations of the sensitivity of the results
 to alternative samples and variable definitions. Following Venturini (1993, Table
 E), we calculated some interaction terms between private label and advertising and
 private label and initial concentration (Table H). The interaction of PL11 and a con-
 centration dummy split at CRA of 50 percent, allowed testing for different effects
 in concentrated and unconcentrated industries. Venturini's two-stage model and
 empirical support suggests that private label will exert its greatest deconcentrating
 effect in the more concentrated markets. In the shorter 1977 to 1987 period (Equa-
 tion 5a), neither interaction term was significant, but in the longer period (Equation
 5b) the private-label effect was negative for the less concentrated industries and
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 TABLE IL Regression results explaining concentration change in 48 U.S.
 food and tobacco manufacturing industries
 Independent Time Periods: a - 1977 to 1987, b - 1967 to 1987
 variables 5a 5b 6a 6b
 ICR -0.052 -0.346a -0.065 -0.261a
 (-0.636) (-3.082) (-0.953) (-2.582)
 GRÒ -0.028 -0.012 -0.031 -0.012
 (-1.378) (-1.349) (-1.608) (-1.349)
 TVR -0.425 0.853
 (-0.761) (1.029)
 PLULA -0.003 -0.256e
 (-0.025) (-1.619)
 PLH H A (0.083) (0.059)
 (0.503) (0.229)
 PLH - CR4 < -0.006 -0.261e
 50 (-0.059) (-1.620)
 PL77 • CR4 > 0.074 0.183
 50 (0.360) (0.610)
 R2 0.014 0.135 0.026 0.131
 Note: t statistics given in parentheses; superscripts a, b, and c represent
 significance from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
 insignificant for the more concentrated industries, contrary to Venturini's findings.
 In Equations 6a and 6b, the interaction between private label and TAS (split at
 TAS - 1 %) was tested. Again in the shorter period, neither was significant. In the
 longer period, private label share ( P LIT LA ) did have a negative, significant effect
 for industries with low advertising intensities. In the more advertising-intensive
 industries, private label share was unrelated to concentration change.
 The four models that are presented in Table in examine possible nonlinearities
 in the effect from advertising intensity. Because separating total advertising into
 its two forms did not prove successful, we limit ourselves to examining TAS11 .
 In the first two models, we omit PL and use TAS11 and its square. Neither
 prove significant in the shorter time period (Equation 7a), but in the longer period
 TAS11 reaches positive significance at the 10 percent level and combined with its
 quadratic term remains positive throughout the relevant range (Equation 7b). Model
 8 is the first time we included the MESH variable. It is consistently positive and
 significant in both periods. This finding is consistent with Sutton's theory that the
 larger the MES , the fewer firms that will be able to fit into the industry profitably.
 However, readers should recall our reservations about the construction of the MES
 variable. In the longer 1967 to 1987 period, the addition of the MES variable does
 provide improved results with both the advertising terms reaching significance and
 overall the model provides the highest adjusted Ř2 so far.












































 « . o /-S JO £ /- N « /-S ^ es . vo o ^ tí- m r-» ft m « co K /-S es T>
 ro Q Q ^ ^  vo ro >
 es o © o vo vo^hooco t<) m m -jj
 X) Ö CS Ö Ö Ö - «NON ^ N O «
 o i i w i i w i i w 8,
- - g
 «
 /-V _ /-N y U /-v .O /-S .O /-s O
 h oo ^ _ ft io On oo i- i On ï nû nû »h >
 « r- o co vo ooiQooQ oo^f « oooot^poo ooiQooQ os^^o -h «- •
 eo ö ö ö ö ö -î es* ö es* o N ö c
 2 i ¿ w i ¿ ~ ¿ ~ §
 21
 0
 •_ r-N r~' /- N jQ /-N .Û /~' ,-H
 O qo in^too^TfONio o tí *0 ^ - '^nvègsor^as- ' es tí c
 es in ono-hOmonoon < e3
 o (N d^ooNorid^ ö
 ¡sil ON Vw/ liliali <*_✓ ' V ' "ìON Vw <*_✓ ' V
 1
 fço 35 Q  çocor-^-r-ftcocs ooo 35 or^r-r-ONONcoTf ooo o j¿
 öo © -î © © © © *-î öS
 «S ' ¿ 1 ¿ 1 ¿ e
 <ë
 O n Ç Tj-ín^^ in (o ^ r- "*t S O vo »-< «n co ^ o' (S q n ^
 00 cS oo © vq co es es ft tJ- ro vo o es ¿ ON Oes Ö^h'ÖÖ Tfr-Iöcs^'roö -d
 Õ ¡S 1 ¿ 1 ¿ 1 ¿ "" i ¿ w .1 -d
w c
 VO G
 On ^ A ^ ^ ^ ^ *> "7 ^ A on co ^ (o -h ^ n P ^ oo P ^ ^ ín n fí ■ xS£ en oo vn m oo On m co oo m m cL X) O ON por^p^ csoocsr^ooTi-1-t £>
 ► o o ö es' ö o h o o h o n' o „
 » <5 1 ¿ 1 ¿ ~i¿.~ I „
 S
 K» JO /*S /"N /*' Q /«■>, «
 m ft ^ vo oo o or-csr- m ea
 ft ^3! ^ in in m »n <s vo M- f^c« ft S es co o ^ in n h es tí- es es 0-2 f^c«
 is '¿ rf6?í 0 t
1 I
 'C ^-so^x-s ,-v _ Vi
 <D VO ^ CO vo m 1- I VO • CS CS Tt ;s
 Om es on ro oo in -i es ft O r- »n Ö
 o O CO O 'û h; h ^ N <H h O «








 "I ^ ^ f. i
 8- ftí g S § % £ f. £ £ !
 • 2:
 490 JOHN M. CONNOR ET AL.
 The last two models in Table HI repeat the first two but make a modification
 in the TAS11 variable by limiting the values to no higher than 8 percent. Three
 industries (chewing gum, 11.7%, cereals, 10.1%, and liquor, 8.8%) with TAS11
 values exceeding 8 percent were given the value of 8% in the new variable called
 TASCAP . This is a check on whether the extreme range of TAS was causing
 estimation difficulties, especially when TAS was squared. The results in Equations
 9a to 1 Ob suggest that the extreme values of TAS were indeed biasing the estimates.
 TASCAP and its square are significant and yield a positive effect beyond the range
 of the TAS values. However, the truncated variable does not help the significance
 levels of either PL or IS. Although the models shown in Table in contain our
 best-filling models, none approach the goodness of fit of Venturini's (1993) or
 Rogers' (1984) best models.12
 VID. Conclusions
 We fail to find any evidence supporting a dynamic version of Galbraith's counter-
 vailing-power hypothesis. Nothing in our empirical work can be construed as
 support for the idea that retailer vertical competition kept U.S. food-manufacturing
 from becoming more concentrated in the 1980s, though Venturini found such a
 relationship in earlier periods. Nor can we find support for Sutton's (1991) model
 that suggests that industry size is inversely related to concentration. The reasons
 for rejecting these models deserve investigation.
 There are three avenues that we believe may reward further empirical effort.
 First, our results for the 1980s may be due to special characteristics of the decade.
 We have already mentioned the egregiously lax enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws,
 especially merger controls. We note that Rogers and Ma (1994) also find that the
 pre- Venturini models of concentration change have broken down in the 1980s. It is
 quite common for macroeconomic conditions to break previously sturdy structural
 relationships. In their study of the influence of buyers' concentration on allocative
 efficiency, Clevinger and Campbell (1977) also found the significance of buyer
 CR4 sensitive to time period.
 12 In some further testing, not reported here, we found that the effect from ICR did differ depend-
 ing on whether the industry was initially concentrated or unconcentrated. The more concentrated
 industries displayed a much smaller (about one-half the size) estimated coefficient than was found in
 the unconcentrated (CR4 < 50) industries. This result is consistent with that found by Tokle, Rogers
 and Adams (1990) for all manufacturing industries over the 1967 to 1982 period. Additionally, like
 Venturini, we found that the deconcentrating effect from growth differed for industries with low adver-
 tising (less than 1%) from that found in higher advertising industries. Only in the low-advertising
 industries did growth have a significant deconcentrating effect. In addition, we estimated a model for
 the 1977 to 1987 period where every variable was entered in both its 1977 level (e.g., PL11) and
 as an absolute change from 1977 to 1987 (except for growth, which was a percentage change). In
 these models both PL and change in PL took negative signs, but insignificant. Growth was negative
 and significant at the 10 percent level. The change in TAS was insignificant, both in a statistical
 sense and in magnitude, but the level variable, TASI!, was negative and significant, contrary to our
 expectations.
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 Second, our results may depend on the particular measure of private label share
 PL that we devised. Perhaps in the 1980s food manufacturers developed strate-
 gies (e.g., promotional expenditures) to counteract effectively against private-label
 programs. Perhaps the PL measure should exclude unlabeled products. Perhaps
 retailer backward vertical integration works differently from contractual private-
 label purchases. Perhaps the information advantages of retailers have become the
 major source of countervailing power, and private-label programs no longer provide
 any clout for retailers.
 Third, more attention needs to be given to alternative market samples. Marion
 and Kim (1991) concluded that statistical studies of concentration change really
 have nothing to say about producer-good industries in food manufacturing. It
 is obvious that the largest increases in food-industry concentration occurred in
 producer-good industries or nearly homogenous-good consumer industries, such
 as beefpacking (Connor, 1991). This upheaval in historical patterns in the 1980s is
 a most curious phenomenon.
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